EVOLUTIONARY ENFORCEMENT AT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Jayne W Barnard"
Hundreds of critics in the past eighteen months have heaped abuse on the SEC Enforcement Division. How could the Division have missed so much misbehavior on Wall Street? How could the Division's young lawyers have been charmed by Bernie Madoff and thwarted from discovering his terrible crimes?
Most critics seem to agree that the Division's most urgent needs include developing substantially more financial sophistication among Division lawyers and investigators; better communications within the Commission and with other federal agencies; and a meaningful system for handling tips and processing information.
The SEC's response to its critics has been remarkable. The Commission has enlisted an energetic cadre of former federal prosecutors to lead the Division. They have redeployed comfortable, desk-bound middle managers back into the field to investigate market misconduct. Reversing the Commission's tradition of micromanagement, they have given senior lawyers new authority to issue subpoenas and initiate settlements. A major reorganization plan is already underway.
The SEC, in short, is in the midst of"the most significant revamp of the division in the last 30 years." This Article begins with the optimistic hope that the current reorganization is successful in meeting the most urgent needs of the Division. It then sketches out six suggestions for further improving the Enforcement Division: a bounty program to compensate informants who come forward with useful information; a victim services unit; a proposal to develop behavioral expertise within the Division; a surveillance and monitoring program for defendants demonstrating a recidivist profile; a sanction policy for individuals that is proportionate, progressive, remedial, and real; and regular publication of meaningful data regarding losses from fraud in the securities markets.
Many people in the past eighteen months have expressed their fury at the failures of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Some of the most impassioned criticisms have been directed at the SEC's Enforcement Division. Critics have lambasted Enforcement for failure to employ modem data-mining techniques in order to sniff out fraudulent online investment schemes; failure to respond to credible evidence of fraud because Enforcement lawyers and investigators lacked the financial sophistication to understand complex transactions and modem trading techniques; failure to interact and exchange infonnation with other SEC divisions and other federal regulators; failure to deploy adequate resources to deal with complex investigations; and management failures in assignment and prosecution of specific Enforcement cases. Some critics also think the Division has spent so much time on "little" cases and "little" defendants that it has missed the forest for the trees.
1 Critics and supporters alike have offered many suggestions for reform of the Enforcement Division. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has urged the SEC to develop a knowledge management program to facilitate intra-agency exchange of information. 2 The Government Accountability Office has recommended that the Enforcement Division revisit the "level and mix of resources available to investigative staff in the areas of administrative and paralegal support, specialized services and expertise, and information technology support. " 3 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:403 (2) a victim services unit within the Enforcement Division; (3) a proposal to add behavioral expertise to the investigational resources ofthe Division; (4) a surveillance and monitoring program for offenders demonstrating a recidivist profile; (5) a sanction policy for individual defendants that is proportionate, progressive, remedial, and real; and ( 6) regular publication of meaningful data regarding losses from fraud in the securities markets.
14 Each ofthese proposals would strengthen the Enforcement Division and assist in its mission of protecting investors.
I. A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ENFORCEMENT DMSION
The Enforcement Division has undergone a radical transformation since Mary Schapiro was sworn in as SEC Chairman in January, 2009. Not only did Schapiro quickly cashier and replace long-time Division ChiefLinda Chatman Thomsen. 15 Both the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee convened public hearings to explore the myriad failings of the Division (and other units of the Commission) throughout the preceding decade. 16 Ironically, there were no Congressional hearings when the previous SEC Chairman set up a series of procedures that hobbled the Enforcement Division. 17 The Commission very quickly appointed three key players to lead the Enforcement Division: (1) Robert Khuzami, a former prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney's office for the Southern District ofNew York and, at the time of his appointment, General Counsel for the Americas at Deutsche Bank AG;
18 (2) George Canellos, former Chief of the Major Crimes Unit in the U.S. Attorney's office for the Southern District of New York and, at the time of his appointment, a partner in the New York firm ofMilbank, Tweed, Hadley & 
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McCloy; 19 and (3) Lorin Reisner, also a former prosecutor and, at the time of his appointment, a partner in Debevoise & Plimpton LLC. 20 They walked into a Division that was under-resourced, demoralized, and insecure.2 1 Khuzami immediately began to talk about some of the Division's most needed reforms: More trial lawyers, more paralegals, and better information technology. 22 Chairman Schapiro floated the idea of a "fraud college" to train the staff to better spot market abuses. 23 Inevitably, the Enforcement staff felt both pride and fear as the Division unveiled its management changes.2 4 In August of2009, Khuzami reflected on the early days ofhis leadership during a major policy speech to the Association of the Bar of the City ofNew York. 25 He cited increased activity in the Division (based on numbers of investigations opened and cases filed); the "flattening of management" by redeploying branch chiefs to handle less paper and conduct more on-theground investigations; delegation of power to senior lawyers in the regional branches to handle "routine case decisions"; delegation to the same senior lawyers of the power to initiate formal investigations with accompanying subpoena power; and streamlining the cumbersome "Action Memo" process (seeking authorization from the full Commission). 28 A few weeks later, the Commission itself released a new Strategic Plan, setting ambitious goals-such as a 90% "success" rate and no more than 8% employee turnover-for the Enforcement Division.
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The most constructive development during this tumultuous year has undoubtedly been the decision to re-engineer the Division to promote communication, continuity, and expertise. As early as April, 2009, the Division's new leaders signaled that they would establish teams of specialists to focus on particular types of fraud schemes. 30 In August, 2009, they unveiled the new structure, announcing the creation of five specialized units: Asset Management (focusing on investment advisers, investment companies, hedge funds, and private equity funds); Market Abuse (focusing on large-scale market abuses and complex manipulation schemes by institutional traders, market professionals, and others); Structured and New Products (focusing on complex derivatives and financial products, including credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and securitized products); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; and Municipal Securities and Public Pensions.
31
In addition, the SEC will create an Office of Market Intelligence that will be responsible for "the collection, analysis, risk-weighing, triage, referral and monitoring ofthe hundreds of thousands of tips, complaints and referrals that the Agency receives each year.'m And the Enforcement Division will appoint a chief operating officer who will "manage information technology, oversee project management and build efficient workflow processes. ' involving the "greatest and most immediate harm" and on cases that send "an outsized message of deterrence"; working to "better determine on an informed basis whether to continue an investigation"; and "building strong cases so that defendants [will] settle quickly." 34 Khuzami's ultimate goal, he said, was for the Division to be more "nimble." We need "to move our cases more quickly and to free up time and resources to take on new matters with greater urgency and impact. " 35 Khuzami deserves cautious praise for these initiatives. Re-inventing a complex, lawyer-heavy workplace is a huge undertaking, and it may fail. Assume, however, that these initiatives are successful. 
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The SEC's own Inspector General, however, has recently urged the Commission to seek Congressional authority to create a new bounty program that would pay for information about any securities law violation. Such a program, he says, would provide the necessary incentives for people with knowledge (or even well-founded suspicion) to bring forward information about possible illegal activity. 41 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has also suggested she favors a broader bounty program. "Right now, the main reward for being a whistleblower is the good feeling you get of having done something important, because we don't have the authority to pay," she told the House Appropriations Committee. 42 She favors the notion of a broad-spectrum bounty program, because "[ w ]histleblowers tend to do a lot of the work for you, hand you something that's pretty fully baked.'>4 3 Professor Pamela Bucy has been even more specific about the value of informants and the need for financial incentives to encourage them to come forward:
Public regulators, law enforcement, administrative agencies cannot effectively detect, prove, or deter complex economic wrongdoing without inside information. It is just too hard to piece together what is wrong .
• • * 40. When the possibility of SEC bounty authority first surfaced in Congress in 1988, the prospect caused considerable alarm within the Commission's enforcement staff: According to Lawrence Iason, Regional Administrator of the SEC's New York office, the bounty provision will create so much havoc, the agency should consider never using it: "The Commission should consider taking the position it will never enter into these arrangements." The New York chief said the SEC already receives tips from informants, some of them valuable and many of them worthless, but with the new legislation, people will be coming out of the woodwork with allegations. "Staff will be overburdened trying to sort out which leads to pursue, determining in successful cases who is entitled to the money, and defending its actions in court," he said. (2002) ("Economic wrongdoing is difficult to detect and prove. Often, it is hidden within a large organization, buried in paper trails and electronic messages, concealed by false documentation, involves complex and intricate transactions, and has many participants, none of whom may know the full extent of the conduct or even, for some, that there are any improprieties. Reconstruction of the illegality requires sophisticated investigators and attorneys with significant investigative resources and legal skill.").
45 There are some drawbacks, of course, to the use of bounty programs. The biggest objection to adoption of an SEC bounty program, as was the case in 1988, 54 will be that the Enforcement Division already receives more tips than it can reasonably handle. The single greatest failure in the SEC's involvement with Bernie Mad off, for example, was the Division's failure to understand and pursue the information brought to it (repeatedly) by Harry Markopolos. (Ironically, Markopolos was driven, in part, by a mistaken belief that he would be entitled to a bounty for the information he shared with Enforcement staff lawyers.) 55 If the Division does not have the resources-or the analytical capacity-to handle existing tips about securities fraud, then generating more tips can only make matters worse. Therefore, any meaningful proposal for a bounty program must be preceded by the creation of a tip-handling system that is capable of recognizing the kinds of information that are worthy of further pursuit. We can only hope that the new Office ofMarket Intelligence can meet that threshold requirement.
Even assuming a workable tip-handling apparatus is in place, however, bounty programs can still create problems. Bounty programs may be inefficient, giving rise to specious tips, for example, or encouraging people to "save up" information rather than taking steps to correct the misconduct of which they are aware. Bounty programs may also discourage law enforcement officials from aggressively pursuing their own investigations-it is always easier to wait for an informant to come forward with a package of evidence than to go through the gritty kind of investigation, document review, and transactional reconstruction required to build a securities fraud case. Bounties may also increase demands on regulatory staff, who not only have to sift through informants' tips, but also may have to determine just how much a piece of information is worth (this may be particularly difficult when confronted with the claims of multiple informants). It is possible, indeed likely, that the Enforcement Division would need to create a special task force or unit simply to deal with the expectations of informants. The staff would not only need to sort out the meritorious from the unmeritorious tips, but it might also need to determine the relationship(s) between the informant(s) and the scheme(s).
56
Some critics object to bounty payments because they monetize virtue. And, inasmuch as they discourage voluntary whistleblowing, bounties may also undermine the public's respect for the law. In the debates leading up to the enactment of the bounty provision of the Major Fraud Act, for example, one senator seriously condemned the program as a form of"bribe."
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Finally, some critics have cautioned that "encouraging citizens to be informers would create an insidious climate of betrayal and mistrust throughout society." 58 As one commentator has put it, when we rely on bounty programs we put ourselves at risk ofbecoming a "nation ofsnitches."
59 This seems to me to be a particularly unpersuasive argument. Is it better that people ignore ongoing frauds than that, as a society, we encourage those people to speak up and shut the frauds down? And just how much damage is done to the social fabric when we reward whistleblowers for thwarting economic crimes? I would argue, "not much." We live, after all, in a Panopticon culture. Our friends and coworkers may already be watching every move we make.
60
And what about the many advantages of bounty programs? As Professor Bucy suggests, bounty programs reduce the cost of law enforcement investigations. They are not only instrumental in bringing forth hidden information-sometimes deeply camouflaged information-at a comparatively low cost. They also cost nothing if the information received is not productive. This is win-win law enforcement.
There are other advantages to informant bounty programs: they enhance the likelihood of detection of wrongdoing and, thus, serve to deter some frauds. Unlike substantive regulation, bounty programs act as a deterrent to fraud without interfering in the legitimate process of capital accumulation; when properly designed, they encourage informants to gather information, analyze what they know, seek out additional documentation, and organize the information in a useful and comprehensible form; they provide an outlet for employees who have been ordered to participate in wrongdoing and have lost or fear for their jobs for refusal to go along.
61 Bounties generate access to information that otherwise might never come to the attention of the law enforcement agency, especially in circumstances where victims of fraud might not yet know they have been defrauded. In addition, by focusing law enforcement agencies on "true" problems rather than imagined or possible problems, they reduce the cost not only for the enforcing agency but also for defendants who must respond to inquiries and organize a defense.
The existing SEC program for information about insider trading provides for an award ofup to 10% of the proceeds to an informant whose information leads to the imposition of a civil penalty. 62 This award is discretionary with the SEC and is not subject to judicial review. 63 It is unavailable to law enforcement officials who discover evidence of fraud in the course of their duties. 64 66 This statute, passed in the wake of the savings and loan crisis, contains a multilayered program for the payment of bounties to informants. It is, among other things, markedly more generous than the SEC's current program. First, informants who provide original information about banking law violations that lead to recovery of a criminal fine, restitution, or civil penalty may be entitled to recover up to 25% of the amount recovered, or $100,000, whichever is less.
67 As with the current SEC program, bounties are not available under this provision to employees of the government who come into possession of the information in the course of their regular duties.
68 Importantly, they are also unavailable to individuals who knowingly participated in the wrongdoing. 69 Second, informants who come forward with information about bank fraud that is critical to a criminal conviction may be entitled to receive a reward. 70 In addition, if the conviction results in a recovery of funds, the informant may also share in the recovery as follows: 20-30% ofthe first $1 million; 10-20% of the next $4 million; and 5-10 percent of the next $5 million. 71 Third, informants who provide information that leads to the recovery of a defendant's assets have a right to share in the recovery based on the same formula used for those who provide information on the merits.
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There are other models, too, that might form the basis for a comprehensive SEC bounty program. 73 What is most important, however, is not the details of
We would recommend that the Exchange Act be amended to authorize the SEC to award a bounty for information leading to the recovery of a civil penalty from any violator of the federal securities laws, not simply insider trading violations. We would also suggest that the Exchange Act be amended to provide specific criteria for awarding bounties, including a provision that where a whistleblower relies upon public information, such reliance does not constitute an absolute bar to recovering a bounty. The statute should also require that the whistleblower be provided with status reports at certain milestones during the investigation or examination that was based on the tip. how the program would run, but rather obtaining the authority to establish such a program and a commitment within the Enforcement Division to provide a reward for useful information.
III. THE SEC SHOULD ESTABLISH A VICTIM SERVICES UNIT
The SEC has long taken the position that it is not a collection agency for victims of securities fraud. Still, in recent years (and with the prodding of Congress), the Commission has vastly improved its record of distributing the proceeds of disgorgement recoveries to victims. 74 In this respect, the Commission is already providing a critical service for many victims, but it could and should do much more.
Let us begin with the proposition that victims of fraud can suffer terribly from their victimization. They not only lose money, they can also lose selfrespect, their status in the community, their sense of trust, their sense of value to their family, psychological well-being, physical health, hopes for the future, a sense of accomplishment (as evidenced by the wealth they've accumulated over a lifetime), and a sense of competence to manage their own affairs. Many victims of fraud are simply destroyed. 75 Not insignificantly, many fraud victims redirect their anger and shame from the perpetrator( s) who stole their money to the government agencies that failed to protect them. Bernie Madoff's victims, for example, have excoriated the SEC for its failure to detect Madoff's decades-long scheme. They have held rallies, importuned Congress, written blistering letters to the media, told their stories repeatedly on TV, and testified at Madoff's sentencing. 76. In that proceeding, victims said things like "I am a victim because our government has failed me," ''The SEC's incompetence has let this psychopath steal from me," and"[ w]e have been devastated by the SEC's failure." Judge Denny Chin fmally had to admonish the victims to focus on the task at hand, the sentencing ofMadoff, and to stop trying to use the occasion to criticize the government. Jayne W. One way the SEC could help to restore its reputation as the protector of investors would be to create an in-house victim services unit. Employees of this unit would not serve as lawyers for victims, nor as psychotherapists. A victim services unit would, however, professionalize communications with victims, serve as a link between victims and lawyers within the Division, and ensure that victims are, and remain, informed about the progress of the enforcement proceeding.
The SEC currently (and perhaps surprisingly) does not have a designated victim services unit. Occasionally, an Enforcement Division lawyer will work directly with one or more victims to gather facts or prepare their testimony for trial. Sometimes, in big cases, the Enforcement Division creates an informational web page. 79 More frequently, when a case is settled, a fund administrator is appointed to handle claims and disburse disgorgement proceeds to the victims. Fund administrators may set up a call center or establish a website to help victims with their claims.
The SEC also has an Office of Investor Education and Advocacy that fields inquiries from investors, including those who have been defrauded. But, when the money has been lost, and in the absence of a criminal proceeding, victims of securities fraud are essentially left on their own. 80 In an odd case of legislative line drawing, victims of frauds whose victimizers are prosecuted criminally receive vastly more victim communication and support than do 77. On the day ofMadoff's sentencing, many victims skipped the proceeding in order to attend a rally outside the courthouse where they inveighed against the SEC. They wore T-shirts that read, "SEC FAILED US. victims of otherwise identical frauds that are handled through the SEC's civil enforcement system.
81
What might an SEC victim services unit do? The functions of prosecutorial victim assistance programs can give us some clues:
( 1) contacting victims to alert them to the unfolding of an enforcement action; (2) explaining the process of civil enforcement and why a particular proceeding will be civil rather than criminal; (3) explaining the possible remedies available in a civil proceeding and soliciting victims' input; ( 4) assisting victims in assembling and documenting their claims; ( 5) assisting victims in preparing affidavits, statements, or demonstrative evidence for testimony at trial; ( 6) communicating with victims about litigation developments, including settlement; (7) preparing victims for court proceedings; (8) accompanying victims to court proceedings; (9) referring victims for psychological support services (not providing direct delivery of services); ( 1 0) offering a clearinghouse of information (for example, about tax issues, pending legislation, and, where applicable, submissions to the SIPC); (11) helping to dispel "magical thinking" about the possibility of complete fmancial recovery; ( 12) providing follow-up communication with victims after an enforcement proceeding is concluded to make sure they understand their rights; and ( 13) debriefing victims who have information about the location of assets or possible post-settlement violations of injunctive orders or occupational bars. The keys to victim support are listening to victims' stories, keeping them apprised of developments in the case, and answering their questions about the legal process and their rights.
Why should the SEC add victim services to its already-full plate? Critics could argue that providing victim services only protracts the victimhood experience and often fosters dependency. Others might argue that private lawyers, therapists, family members, and clergy are better situated than government employees to perform the tasks of victim support. Victim support can be labor intensive and requires empathy, patience, and mature judgment. It is therefore expensive and sometimes unwelcome. 81 . The Crime Victims Rights Act of2004 provides to "crime victims" the right to be present at public court proceedings involving the crime and the right to be "reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding." 18 U.S.C.
§ § 377I(a)(2}-{4) (2006). The statute also directs people in the Department of Justice to "make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a)." § 377I(c)(I One can acknowledge the challenges and costs of victim support but still insist that victims of fraud--even those frauds that, for whatever reason, do not result in criminal prosecution-are victims and do suffer. They merit respect and support. The time has passed when we can assume that fraud victimization is merely a matter of being too gullible or too greedy; or that our response to victims should be governed by arcane jurisdictional distinctions between the Department of Justice (which is governed by the Crime Victims Rights Act and therefore provides victim support) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (which is not and therefore does not). 82 As we discovered in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack on 9/11, victims of crime often care much, much more about having someone listen to their stories than they care about fighting over available dollars. 83 Within reason, the SEC should have a system in place to listen.
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION SHOULD DEVELOP EXPERTISE ABOUT THE BIOGRAPHICAL, BEHAVIORAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF lNDMDUAL SECURITIES LAW VIOLATORS
Much has been made in recent months of the SEC's inability to follow the trail of complex, derivatives-based trading schemes and other sophisticated sources of fraud on investors. What the Enforcement Division needs, according to critics, are keen mathematical minds trained in finance who can keep up with new products and financial engineering models. 84 It also needs more people with technological expertise. 85 Nobody disagrees. Let me, however, stake out a different claim here. At the same time the SEC expands its financial and technological expertise to detect complex fmancial schemes, it should also build a knowledge base about the kinds of defendants who engineer these schemes. There is much to be learned through 82 systematic study of the biographical backgrounds, behavioral quirks, and psychological profiles of securities law violators. The Enforcement Division should build behavioral expertise alongside the other forms of expertise it is currently seeking. It should create a small unit devoted to the application of forensic psychology to the task of securities law enforcement. What would the employees of a behavioral unit do? First, they would compile detailed information about the defendants in already-closed securities fraud cases. They might-and should-also conduct forensic assessments of securities law violators sitting in prison. The product of this process would be a rich tapestry of data that might reveal commonalities among these defendants. Reviewing that material in a systematic way might permit some reasonable prediction about which defendants are likely to recidivate or otherwise harm the investing public. 86 The process, in addition, might provide useful information about the circumstances in which the SEC's civil sanctions-cease-and-desist orders, obey-the-law injunctions, penny stock bars, and officer-and-director bars-are likely to fail.
Second, the behavioral unit would work with investigators and lawyers in current cases, bringing psychological expertise to the table. People in the behavioral unit could ( 1) assist investigators in conducting background checks and behavioral analyses of targets of investigation; (2) help identify which targets of investigation present a recidivism profile; 87 (3) help identify those defendants who should be referred for criminal prosecution; ( 4) help identify those defendants who need not be prosecuted criminally but are nevertheless deserving of forward-looking civil sanctions; (5) assist in designing meaningful remedial provisions for injunctions and occupational bars for those defendants deserving offorward-looking civil sanctions; ( 6) assist in designing a program for monitoring defendants who have settled their cases but present a high risk of continued violations; 88 and (7) track future encounters with law enforcement agencies of defendants after they have left the SEC system. Employees of the behavioral unit could also consult on organizational behavioral issues when the defendant is a business enterprise. 89 86. There is, of course, a rich history of such projects. For example, states for nearly a century have maintained and analyzed data on the characteristics of imprisoned offenders, in order to make informed parole decisions. See All of these defendants are alleged to have constructed elaborate deceptions, skimmed money off the top to enrich themselves (often wrapping themselves in cocoons of luxury), used some of the funds to enrich their reputation in the community through conspicuous charitable giving, and were able to establish trust and confidence among thousands of customers, clients, and friends. Why and how did they do it? It isn't enough to say they were sophisticated understanding of group dynamics is required to achieve meaningful organizational change).
90. There are many defmitions of" learning organization." Generally, though, a learning organization is one that "facilitates the learning of its members and continuously transforms itself' to more effectively achieve its goals, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki!Leaming_organization (last visited Nov. II, 2009 Do any of these facts (or others) have meaning in identifying, thwarting, or sanctioning Ponzi schemers? Other than through institutional folklore, I'm guessing the SEC does not know.
B. Gathering Information About Defendants Who Engage in Organizational Fraud
Behavioral assessment would not just apply to Ponzi schemers. A behavioral unit could also assess the high-level corporate leaders who lead their companies into financial ruin. Conrad Black, Phillip Bennett, and Bernie Ebbers come to mind.
106 What might we learn by studying these defendants? Even from a distance, there seem to be observable patterns of behavior among the corporate leaders who oversee and facilitate major financial reporting frauds. These executives are generally domineering, narcissistic, charismatic, and grandiose. 107 To reinforce their inflated self-images, they create fictitious transactions, fictitious profits, and ultimately fictitious business empires. This scenario often repeats itself: A CEO with a strong sense ofhis own superiority sometimes cannot face the financial realities of his business, and thus initiates ever-growing accounting adjustments to hide the failure of his vision. 108 He often enlists subordinates who are reluctant to say no, or are eager to be of help.
Thus, the SEC should learn more as well about the chief financial officers who begin with small accounting "fiddles," then escalate their fraud until it (noting that defendant charged with orchestrating a $5 million Ponzi scheme diverted investor funds to a now-bankrupt Texas real estate project becomes uncontrollable. Sometimes, they claim, they are merely trying to meet the company's earnings estimates, which they think of as a harmless and temporary exercise. 109 Often they are engaged in some form of rescue fantasy and believe, in the face of contrary evidence, that they can somehow "with just a little more time" make things right.
110 Sometimes, they are working to protect their own equity stakes and-driven to stay at the top of the pay scale pyramid-become blinded to their crimes. Are these CFOs fantasists? Simply optimists? Have they always been rule breakers or do circumstances and stress reset their ethical thermostats? Do their employment histories or details in their employment files tell us anything we ought to know?
The SEC should also learn more about the middle management defendants who get swept up in the others' misconduct, and, for reasons ofloyalty, fear, or some perverted sense of adventure, become active participants in organizational fraud. Administrative assistants, bookkeepers, tax accountants, and even in-house counsel have ended up in prison for joining a criminal team. What do these people have in common? Are they meek and servile and unable to resist recruitment? Or are they ambitious and outgoing, and think of themselves as born leaders? Do they pride themselves on being problem solvers? Are they acting simply out of economic need?
C. Gathering Information About Other Securities Fraud Offenders
There are other categories of offenders, as well. Brokers who steal from their customers;
111 brokers who defraud their customers by misrepresenting the risks of the products they are selling;
112 pump-and-dump artists who find their victims on the Internet; trades can never be traced. 114 Are these people bullies? Micromanagers? Are they conspicuously religious? Openly hedonistic? Do they need uppers (or downers) to get through the day?
By employing behavioral experts who could systematically study the personality traits and behavioral characteristics of these securities law violators, the Enforcement Division could more effectively target the firms and individuals who deserve investigation, especially in the face of tens of thousands of tips every year.
115 Applying the insights of the behavioral unit, the Enforcement Division could deploy its investigational resources toward the types of people who are likely to generate the most harm.
The point of the behavioral unit, by the way, is not to develop the kind of "profile" by which behavioral generalizations would frame SEC investigations. I certainly do not have in mind the SEC saying "round up all the bald-headed 40-year-old former used-car salesmen who currently smoke cigars, engage in the sale of penny stocks, and also have a drinking problem." Rather, the point is to identify commonalities among defendants-if such exist-and to use that knowledge strategically on a case-by-case basis. Decisions about sanctions based on real data and not merely on gut feelings can only enhance the task of securities law enforcement. We are not talking about fleets of people here. With hundreds of cases each year in the Enforcement Division, 116 a team of fewer than a dozen people-forensic psychologists and criminologists, together with support personnel-could probably handle the work.
The obvious objections to this proposal are the cost and institutional disruption involved in creating a new operating unit; the inevitable clash of wills between lawyers and non-lawyers in what has traditionally been a lawyer-centric agency; the inadequacy of the available population of offenders to give rise to any meaningful statistical data (defendants who have gone through the SEC enforcement system number in the thousands rather than the tens ofthousands---Qr more---Qffenders typically involved in predictive datagathering); the likelihood that retrospective reviews of information about defendants will prove unfruitful because nobody asked the defendants (or others with knowledge) the right questions; notwithstanding these criticisms, by the company and was, at the time of the posting, selling the company's stock).
114. See SEC v. Accord, SEC Litigation Release 21132 (July 15, 2009) (describing insider trading violations by a lawyer and an accountant, as well as in-laws and friends, who acquired shares of a company shortly before it issued an announcement that it was to be acquired).
115. the likelihood of excessive reliance on actuarial, rather than clinical, assessments of targets of investigations and defendants; 117 and the notion that behavioral tracking, as opposed to fugitive tracking or asset tracking, is a law enforcement luxury.
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One might respond to these objections by organizing the behavioral unit as a pilot project, and authorizing it subject to a sunset provision to test whether the unit has been effective in assisting existing Enforcement Division personnel. A better response is to imagine that the addition of behavioral experts to the lawyer-investigator teams that now define and pursue securities fraud wrongdoers might just enrich the agency's performance. Recidivism surfaces regularly at the SEC. 122 Many offenders, particularly Ponzi scheme offenders, have long track records of similar fraud schemes.
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They often also have related histories of misappropriation, fraud, or professional misconduct. 124 The Enforcement Division does not seem to know what to do with these people. So, time after time, we see defendants cycling and recycling through the SEC civil enforcement system. Some defendants have been enjoined by the SEC three, four, five, or even six times. 125 
A. Conducting a Risk Assessment
It is fair to ask how the SEC is supposed to know when it's got a likely recidivist on its hands. When there is a history of documented and similar misconduct in the defendant's record, it's easy. 126 When a defendant appears as a first offender, however, it can be much more difficult. Predictions are inevitably imperfect. Still, there are some markers of likely recidivism, even for first offenders, and the Enforcement Division should become more familiar with those markers.
I have argued elsewhere, for example, that many con artists and Ponzi schemers suffer from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), the technical term for what is often referred to as "psychopathy." This condition is characterized by lifelong habits oflying, conning, cheating, and stealing. Most experts agree the condition is untreatable and that persons who suffer from UNIVERSITY OF PIITSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:403 APD are unlikely-indeed, unable-to reform. 127 These people are devoid of conscience and incapable of remorse even when they have grievously damaged others. They do not respond to imprisonment or threats of imprisonment, let alone something as diaphanous as an obey-the-law injunction or a cease-anddesist order.
128 Financial penalties also do not deter them. It is often difficult to imagine these people as true predators. They are typically smart, charming, raffish, witty, and glib. 129 Little wonder, then, that victims find these schemers and their stories so appealing. It is harder to understand why the Enforcement Division seems to fall into the same trap.
My theory is that most of the recidivists who come before the SEC-perhaps all of them-could have been identified as likely recidivists early or earlier in their careers. Even when they are before the SEC for the first time, these defendants could be identified as likely recidivists if the Enforcement Division had a behavioral unit (or trained individuals) with an understanding of personality disorders.
My prescription here is that the Enforcement Division should recognize the existence of APD and consider the likelihood that many individuals who come before it suffer from this chronic disorder. 130 The Division should treat defendants with a pattern of lying and scamming as special targets. It should ( 1) work to identify at an early stage those defendants who, based on their business and social history, appear constitutionally unable to confine their behavior to social or legal norms; (2) divert those defendants to investigators and attorneys with behavioral expertise (a Recidivism TaskForce); 131 (3) refer many of these defendants for criminal prosecution rather than relying on civil enforcement; (4) refer any of these defendants who have previously been sanctioned by the SEC, for criminal prosecution; 132 (5) within the civil enforcement context, use its knowledge of defendants' behavioral profiles to build the case for injunctive relief and occupational bars; and (6) design very 2010] EVOLUTIONARY ENFORCEMENT 429 specific remedial provisions to minimize the likelihood of recidivism and maximize the chance that defendants who do recidivate are quickly detected. Targeting likely recidivists for special treatment and heightened scrutiny is, of course, not a new idea. The federal Sentencing Guidelines already recognize that a defendant with a criminal history is deserving of harsher treatment than a first-time offender.
133 And almost every punishment theory shares the view that prior offenses are relevant to decisions about current punishment.
134 The same should hold true in civil enforcement proceedings.
B. Post-Sanction Monitoring
The SEC should do more than just catalog personality traits and diagnose defendants' personality disorders in order to identify likely recidivists. It should use what it knows. Importantly, it should do more than treat likely recidivists as if they intend to reform and become good citizens and then (as often currently occurs) send them on their way with an obey-the-law injunction. 135 The vast majority of the SEC's civil enforcement actions result in settlement. Thus, in any case in which an individual defendant presents a recidivism profile and is not referred for criminal prosecution, the Enforcement Division should insist as a condition of settlement on consent to post-sanction monitoring. This monitoring might include unscheduled office and home visits; access to phone records, bank records and state and federal income tax returns; employment verification; periodic interviews with family members, neighbors and co-workers; physical surveillance and computer surveillance; and submission of periodic self-reports by the defendant. The decision to accept such monitoring would be voluntary in the sense that a defendant wishing to avoid it would be welcome to go to trial and convince the judge that he or she is innocent or undeserving of a monitoring regime. Alternatively, the defendant may want to negotiate the specifics of the monitoring provision-lawyers negotiate the fine points ofSEC settlements every day.
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The obvious objections to this proposal are the cost of monitoring; the risk of over-or under-inclusiveness (false positives and false negatives) in identifying those defendants who should be subject to a monitoring regime; privacy issues; the risk of"branding" a first-offender as a recidivism risk, thus enhancing the likelihood of recidivism rather than reducing it; usurpation of authority from the criminal justice system (SEC monitoring would, after all, replicate much of what the FBI is supposed to do); and a general sense that government monitoring, even of people who have defrauded their neighbors, is somehow on-American. One shouldn't have to forfeit his privacy rights in the absence of a criminal prosecution.
A monitoring regime, however, offers several advantages over the current practice of privileging hope (in the form of an obey-the-law injunction) over experience (the many cases in which fraud defendants recidivate): Awareness of the SEC's ongoing interest in one's activities is surely a more effective deterrent than believing (probably correctly) that the SEC has moved on to other matters; regular monitoring offers the possibility of early or earlier intervention in the form of an asset freeze or contempt of court proceeding, in the event the defendant recidivates; monitoring accompanied by quick action is likely to be less costly than having to initiate an entirely new enforcement proceeding "from scratch." It is certainly more attractive to defendants (and less costly to the public) than the alternative of a criminal prosecution.
VI. THE SEC SHOULD ARTICULATE A SANCTION POLICY FOR INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANTS THAT IS PROPORTIONATE, PROGRESSIVE, REMEDIAL, AND 
REAL
Let us assume that the monitoring proposal is not adopted-too expensive, too exotic, perhaps unconstitutional. The SEC Enforcement Division nevertheless should take steps to articulate a coherent sanction policy for securities law violators rather than continuing to employ the current "grab bag" approach to imposing civil remedies.
Over the years, the SEC has successfully importuned Congress to provide it with a rich assortment of remedial enforcement tools--disgorgement orders, cease-and-desist orders, injunctions, civil penalties, penny stock bars, and occupational bars. The SEC also has statutory authority to seek "any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."m There is little, in short, that the SEC cannot seek as a remedy for securities law violations. The obvious limit is imprisonment-only the Department of Justice can seek that punishment. Some observers have argued that the SEC, too, should be able to seek criminal penalties, 138 but that is not the point that I want to make here. Rather, recognizing that the SEC is a civil regulatory agency, and accepting that, as such, it should be confined to seeking civil remedies, I submit that the SEC can and should be more rational in its deployment of remedial tools. Specifically, it should articulate, and then adhere to, a sanction policy that (1) aligns sanctions with culpability and harm; (2) escalates sanctions for repeat offenders; (3) minimizes, through intelligent remedial techniques, the likelihood of repeated misconduct; and ( 4) doesn't waste the agency's time on pointless or cosmetic sanctions.
How might such a sanction policy work? Some securities law violators, it is fair to say, are "situational" wrongdoers-decent, "conventional people" who get caught up in criminal situations. 139 Others are simply bad people who would, in a different environment or with different educational credentials, be just as likely to use a gun and burglarize your home. SEC sanctioning policy should treat these offenders differently.
Thinking about these two models of offenders, we recognize that these descriptions are consistent with two general theories of human behavior-the "dispositionist" theory and the "situationist" theory. 140 A dispositionist believes, for example, that Jones has filed for bankruptcy because he is lazy and lacks self-discipline. A situationist believes that Jones has filed for bankruptcy because, after a medical crisis in his family and, no matter how hard he worked, he couldn't keep up with the family's bills.
Most modem observers agree that neither the dispositionist theory nor the situationist theory adequately captures the process by which most people take action or make decisions about how to behave. A middle ground, known as the "interactionist" theory, better captures the way most people operate. Decisions UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:403 about behavior (including unconscious decisions) are generally a product of the interaction between disposition and situation. 141 Criminologists use a more specific approach to white-collar crime, noting that financial wrongdoers typically exist on a continuum running from "crisis responders" to "opportunity takers" to "opportunity seekers" to "chronic offenders." 142 Crisis responders are the least culpable for their crimes; chronic offenders deserve (and generally receive) far greater punishment.
By introducing the psychologists to the criminologists and putting their concepts together, we can imagine a fraud culpability continuum that looks something like this: Now, let us assume we have a group of securities law violators, all of whom have acted with the requisite scienter and all of whom have caused demonstrable harm. A rational sanctioning policy would reflect the notion that the "dessert" of their wrongdoing should be tied, at least in part, to the defendants' position on the culpability continuum.
How might this work? First, the Enforcement Division (preferably, with the help of its behavioral unitY 43 would situate these defendants somewhere along the continuum. Those who reside at the "chronic offender" end of the scale would be referred to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. 144 There is no point in trying to sanction these offenders with civil sanctions. And, to be clear, where there is clear and convincing evidence that the offender is a "chronic offender" on the basis of prior interactions with the SEC
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EVOLUTIONARY ENFORCEMENT 433 or other law enforcement agencies, there should be no second chance for civil enforcement. Chronic offenders should be criminally prosecuted. The SEC should end the practice of seeking sequential injunctions for members of this group.'4s Offenders at the "crisis responder" end of the scale, on the other hand, should generally be subject only to disgorgement of profits and (perhaps) to entry of a cease-and-desist order. They may also be candidates for a civil penalty. 146 They will only rarely be suitable candidates for imposition of an injunction or any kind of occupational bar. 147 Monitoring is unnecessary for this population. Crisis responders, in short, are not scoundrels and pose little threat to the investment markets. Heaping unnecessary sanctions on these offenders-assuming they are correctly categorized-is a waste of law enforcement resources and undermines respect for the SEC.
The most interesting defendants, of course, are the ones in the middle of the spectrum between the chronic offenders and the crisis responders. The opportunity takers present, for me, the most interesting challenge. Opportunity takers do not set out to engage in fraud, but are willing to do so if the circumstances seem sufficiently inviting. Their level of scienter is, by definition, higher than that of a crisis responder but lower than that of an opportunity seeker. And, unlike opportunity seekers, the risk of recidivism for an opportunity taker is low. Thus, opportunity takers should rarely be 145. There will, of course, be exceptions to the "no second chance" rule, where the evidence may not support a criminal conviction but can support a civil judgment. But those exceptions should be rare. Chronic offenders are dangerous predators and should be dealt with in the criminal justice system. The preference of some U.S. attorneys to reject these cases as ''too small to prosecute" is bad public policy and should be addressed at a higher level within the Justice Department.
146. First-tier penalties are available for defendants who violate any provision of the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 78u( d)(3)(B)(i) (2006) . The maximum first-tier penalty for a natural person is the greater of $5,000 or the amount of his pecuniary gain from the violation. Second-tier penalties are available for defendants who violate any provision of the federal securities laws in a manner that involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2006). The maximum second-tier penalty for a natural person is the greater of$50,000 or the amount of his pecuniary gain from the fraud.
Third-tier civil penalties are available for the same defendants as those who are eligible for a secondtier penalty, but third-tier penalties are imposed in cases of frauds that "directly or indirectly result ... in substantial losses or create a significant risk of substantial losses to other persons." 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii) (2006). The maximum third-tier penalty for a natural person is the greater of$100,000 or the amount of his pecuniary gain from the fraud. candidates for an injunction or an occupational bar. They may be candidates for a civil penalty. 148 Monitoring should be a low priority for this population. Opportunity seekers ratchet up the sanctioning stakes. In the jargon of the entrapment defense, opportunity seekers are people with a predisposition to crime. 149 They are natural candidates for imposition of injunctions and, often, for occupational bars. They may also be candidates for a civil penalty. 150 This is a population for whom monitoring may be appropriate.
Categorizing offenders systematically more or less along these lines will lead to more coherent, proportional sanctions for securities law violators. It will also permit an escalation of sanctions for those who present a risk of future harm. It will put monitoring resources where they are most needed. And, finally, it will ensure that the truly predatory securities law violators-the chronic offenders-are sanctioned appropriately by the criminal justice system, not treated ineffectively with civil sanctions that they can (and often do) ignore.
There is one last factor in any rational sanctioning policy. Where defendants have been diverted for criminal prosecution and have pleaded or been found guilty, the SEC should generally leave them alone. Often, the Enforcement Division lags behind the Justice Department and, after a defendant has gone off to prison, pursues some unnecessary sanction like an officer-and-director bar, 151 an occupational bar, 152 or an injunction. 153 This kind of piling on is wasteful and unwise. 154 If, as Robert Khuzami has said, the goal of Enforcement is to use its resources "strategically" and achieve meaningful results, 155 then pursuing civil sanctions against a defendant who is languishing in prison makes little sense. 156 And keeping cases open rather than quickly
